The three main approaches in statistical inference -classical statistics, Bayesian and likelihoodare in current use in phylogeny research. The three approaches are discussed and compared, with particular emphasis on theoretical properties illustrated by simple thought-experiments. The methods are problematic on axiomatic grounds (classical statistics), extra-mathematical grounds relating to the use of a prior (Bayesian inference) or practical grounds (likelihood). This essay aims to increase understanding of these limits among those with an interest in phylogeny.
Introduction
Too often, debates as to the relative merits of maximum likelihood and Bayesian phylogeny reconstruction are held in isolation from the theory and application of likelihood and Bayesian statistics in general, or indeed of statistical inference in general, 'the process whereby data are observed and then statements are made about unknown features of the system that gave rise to the data' (Beaumont and Rannala 2004) . When considering philosophical matters of statistical inference, it is more natural to begin with the fundamental principles involved and also their implications for simple case studies. Later, one might progress to consider the implications for complicated case studies, such as phylogeny reconstruction.
First, I would like to set the scene, by a review of why we require statistics, the meaning of probability and of the three main schools of statistics in current use: Bayesian, classical and likelihood. Each school has strong justifications and is widely used in phylogenetic research, as well as other areas of biology. Startlingly, each is fundamentally incompatible with the others. They cannot be reconciled because they are seeking answers to different questions. From a likelihood point of view, which currently happens to be my own point of view, the Bayesian approach asks a question that is mathematically valid, though whose value is limited by extra-mathematical considerations; and classical statistics is axiomatically invalid.
Partly because some results are similar or identical for the different approaches, and partly because practitioners tend to jump in to a complex case-study without devoting attention to the basics, these fault lines often go unnoticed, are masked by more pressing difficulties with the input data (e.g. taxon sampling), or are rediscovered as special cases without an appreciation for their generality.
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A separate approach to the question is to compare methods as implemented in practice by software, as opposed to the more theoretical approach taken here (e.g. Douady et al. 2003; Guindon and Gascuel 2003; Yang and Rannala 2005; Simmons and Norton 2013) . Such an approach is extremely valuable to highlight the difference in inferences made by different methods. Where the data are simulated, the disparity between the true phylogeny and the reconstructed phylogeny may also be assessed. However, conclusions from practical analyses are dependent on the specific data analysed, including (for simulations) the models used to simulate those data. Theoretical considerations are also valuable, contributing to understanding by a different route, relevant even to conditions which
have not yet been thought of. The current paper emphasises theoretical considerations, particularly in the first part which is most general, whilst also linking to the extensive literature on practical properties, particularly in the latter part which is more closely tied to the problem of phylogeny reconstruction.
Statistics
When we run an experiment (intended in a broad sense, including everything that is required to reconstruct phylogeny), from the data we want to know: what is the truth here? Is this coin fair or not? Is there a monophyletic clade Ecdysozoa or not? At which date did cyanobacteria originate?
These are the kinds of absolute knowledge we crave.
Such answers are wholly unavailable. What we get with statistics is a quantitative answer to a very specific question. We will never know the truth exactly. Instead, statistics will provide us with some quantitative indication of the probability of hypotheses (Bayesian statistics), the evidence against one particular hypothesis (classical statistics), or the relative extent to which different hypotheses p. 4 are supported (likelihood). These answers are simultaneously deeply disappointing, because they do not reveal truth as such, and almost miraculous, in that they pull some kind of indication of the truth out of a mass of data which may be literally incomprehensible otherwise. A further source of disappointment and/or wonder is that these partial answers, from the three main schools of statistics, by definition can fail to coincide.
Statistics is a young field. As Kahneman (2012, 179) says, regression is such a difficult concept it was not invented until 200 years after the theory of gravitation. (Statistics is not rocket science -but rather, something a little more involved.) And this was 130 years ago -after Lamarck and Darwin, contemporary with D'Arcy Thompson and Wallace -the time of our great grandparents, not some mind-blowingly remote intellectual stone-age.
Probability
Statistical analyses all depend upon a concept of probability. Although there is agreement on the axioms relating to probability, such as its sum rule and product rule, there is no general agreement on the meaning of probability itself.
The Bayesian view of probability is that it indicates degree of belief, ranging from total disbelief (a probability of 0) to total belief (a probability of 1), though there is a question as to whether the upper and lower limits are ever really reached (Kadane 2011, 6) . The Bayesian view of probability is essential to Bayesian inference, but is in conflict with the view of probability required for classical or likelihood inference.
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The frequentist view of probability is that probability indicates frequency in the long run, ranging from something that never occurs (a probability of 0) to something that always happens (a probability of 1). The frequentist view of probability is essential to classical and likelihood inference, but is in conflict with Bayesian inference in general.
Bayesian inference
Bayesian inference is the oldest of the three statistical methods considered in this paper. One approaches the data with a well-defined prior probability distribution, typically not based on the evidence at hand; this is then updated on the basis of the evidence at hand, giving a posterior probability for hypotheses. This allows one to quantify belief in hypotheses. Change either the data at hand or the prior belief, and the posterior probability also changes.
Where the prior is known or else is 'learnt' from relevant training data, Bayesian approaches are uncontroversial. In such cases, the prior probability is equally acceptable whether regarded as belief or as frequency in the long run. For making predictions based on features learnt from data (i.e. empirical priors), no-one objects to a Bayesian approach (e.g. Edwards 1977) , though as in any analysis the details are open to discussion. In prediction, we 'do the best we can' and divergence from fact can be assessed by reference to known data, in a way that is not possible for complex problems of inference. Bayesian approaches such as penalised likelihood and the lasso (Firth 1993; Tibshirani 1996; Bühlmann and van de Geer 2011) have achieved enormous success in fields of prediction, including bioinformatics (e.g. Lim et al. 2013; Lv et al. 2013) . A vast range of methods of sequence analysis incorporate Bayesian techniques (Durbin et al. 1998; Baldi and Brunak 2001; Beaumont and Rannala 2004 ).
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For problems of statistical inference, in general there is no prior based on empirical evidence.
Empirical Bayes (Casella 1985; Efron 2003 ) is a useful development, in which the prior is obtained via the data and model at hand. This is relatively uncontroversial and has important phylogenetic applications, for example in detecting positive selection and in ancestral state reconstruction (Yang et al. 1995; Nielsen and Yang 1998; Pagel 1999) . Perhaps because of the complexity of the inference problem, empirical Bayes in the central task of phylogeny reconstruction is relatively underdeveloped (but cf. Yang and Rannala 2005) . Instead, a 'fully Bayesian' (hierarchical Bayesian) approach is used, with a subjective prior not based on the data at hand. This prior is based, for example, on literature precedent, or very often just on software defaults. This is the controversial aspect of Bayesian inference.
Classical inference
I use 'classical' to refer to any statistical test which relies on consideration of experiments that were not actually performed. This includes p-values, confidence intervals and randomisation tests such as the bootstrap. Classical statistics is often referred to as frequentist, which is true but is confusing because the frequentist view of probability is also used elsewhere (likelihood).
In classical statistics, one approaches the data with a view as to how those data were obtained; intervals, based on areas under a probability density function, may then be calculated. For example, the p-value is the probability of observing a statistic with a value at least as extreme as the value actually observed, on the assumption that the null hypothesis is true. This says nothing about the p. 7 probability of hypotheses themselves, hence a Bayesian would argue these methods are answering the wrong question.
Practical classical statistics, including p-values and confidence intervals, is very widely taught to
undergraduates. Yet p-values and confidence intervals remain almost equally widely misunderstood.
Students, and even worse instructors, often replace the correct definition with something incorrect but more intuitive. For example, often one finds student answers along the lines that 'a low p-value indicates the null hypothesis is improbable'. Certainly a lower p-value indicates lower probability for the null hypothesis than does a higher p-value. But this cannot be quantified because the p-value is conditional on the null hypothesis being true. Hence, a p-value of 0.04 indicates the null hypothesis is less probable than does a p-value of 0.05; but a p-value of 0.05 does not indicate the probability of the null hypothesis is 0.05, or any other particular value (e.g. Lindley 1957 ). Moving from a p-value to a statement about the probability of the null hypothesis requires some prior view on the relative plausibility of the null and alternative hypotheses -a view which is not incorporated into the classical statistical framework.
Another major tool in classical statistics is the confidence interval. The correct definition of confidence intervals is so convoluted as to be only rarely understood (and will not be repeated here, since p-values will be our main example for classical statistical inference). Instead the definition of confidence intervals is often intuitively replaced by a different definition that really corresponds to a 'fiducial interval', although these two types of interval do not generally coincide (Fisher 1956, 64-66; Yang 2006, 151-152) .
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These problems may hint at the possibility that classical statistics is answering the wrong questions, or to put more positive spin on it, answering the right questions in the wrong way; or that classical statistics is deceptively more difficult than it may appear, and almost everyone is innately bad at it.
Likelihood inference
Likelihood inference rejects the Bayesian use of priors and rejects classical statistics as axiomatically invalid. For a given set of observations, the likelihood of a hypothesis is a relative measure of how frequently the data would be observed, if that hypothesis were true. For a given set of observed data, ratios between likelihoods for different hypotheses indicate their relative support.
The maximum likelihood hypothesis is the hypothesis which would lead to the data actually observed, more often than any other hypothesis.
Likelihood inference is subtly but crucially different from classical inference, which when interpreting evidence considers statistics more extreme than the value actually observed (in the case of a p-value) or experiments which were not performed (in the case of confidence intervals).
Likelihood inference rejects, as irrelevant, these non-observed results from non-performed experiments. But in common with classical statistics and in contrast to Bayesian statistics, it regards probability as frequency in the long run and does not attempt to place probabilities on hypotheses.
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Foundations of likelihood inference
One justification for likelihood inference is that it fulfils the criteria one would hope for in a system of inference, in which case it is accepted as axiomatically correct (Edwards 1992, 28-31; Royall 2000) . For given observed data and probability model, the relative support for different hypotheses is expressed only by ratios of points on the likelihood function,
where L(H|D) is the likelihood of a hypothesis H for the observed data D, P(D|H) is the probability of the data D if H were true, and k is an arbitrary constant. If the likelihood axiom is acceptable to a research worker, no further foundation is required.
In Bayesian statistics, the likelihood axiom is accepted, for the part of the inference based on the evidence at hand, automatically due to Bayes' theorem. One may write Bayes' theorem as
where P(H|D) is the posterior probability of hypothesis H for observed data D, P(H) is the prior probability of the hypothesis and k ensures the posterior distribution integrates to 1 (e.g. Edwards 1992, 48) . This highlights the two bases of Bayesian inference: the prior probability P(H), which does not usually depend on on the data at hand; and the likelihood function L(H|D), which does.
Where one is uncomfortable with the use of priors in Bayesian inference, and not ready to immediately accept the likelihood axiom, it may be useful to explore whether there is a more formal p. 10 basis for likelihood inference. The likelihood principle (axiom) has been shown to follow from two other, widely acceptable axioms: the principle of sufficiency and the principle of conditionality (Birnbaum 1962) . Only likelihood inference, and the aspect of Bayesian inference relating to the data at hand, are compatible with both of these axioms simultaneously (Birnbaum 1962; Berger and Wolpert, 1984; Gandenberger 2014) . The likelihood principle may also be arrived at by other means (e.g. Birnbaum 1972; Gandenberger 2014) but remains incompatible with classical statistics (Mayo 2010; Gandenberger 2014 ).
Case study: sufficiency in a coin-tossing experiment
Imagine two independent scientists are observing a coin-tossing robot, to obtain data to estimate the probability of heads for a given coin. One scientist decides in advance to stop making observations after four coin tosses, whatever the number of heads and tails. The other decides in advance to stop making observations after seeing three heads, however many tosses this requires. The two scientists start their observations at the same time. They observe the sequence: heads, heads, tails, heads. Both go home to analyse the data. Should their different stopping rules affect their inferences?
Classical statistics says 'yes'. For hypotheses about the probability of heads (or of tails), the first scientist's stopping rule suggests a binomial null distribution; the second suggests a negative binomial null distribution. The estimate of the probability of heads is the same in each case (3/4), but the different distributions give different p-values for hypothesis tests concerning this estimate.
By the principle of sufficiency in likelihood inference and also as a consequence of Bayes' theorem in Bayesian inference, likelihood and Bayesian inference say 'no'. The likelihood functions for the p. 11 probability of heads, for the two distributions, are proportional; and proportional likelihood functions are equivalent, whether for the same or for different experiments. They tell us exactly the same thing about our 'sufficient statistic', in this case the probability of heads.
This is the principle of sufficiency, informally expressed as 'the irrelevance of observations independent of a sufficient statistic' (Birnbaum 1962) . 'Heads, heads, tails, heads' leads to the same inferences, no matter which stopping rule was used.
Case study: conditionality in a BLAST practical class
A professor is running a bioinformatics practical class, using BLAST (Altschul et al. 1997) , at Obama University. To avoid duplicated effort she has, with acknowledgement, borrowed class instructions, software and sequence databases from a colleague at Cameron University. At Cameron University, all students perform the following exercise: without benefit of genome annotation, seek a homologue of the Mus musculus GULO gene product (whose sequence is provided) among the proteins of Drosophila melanogaster.
At Obama University, the instructor decides to change the teaching material in one respect. To make things more interesting and slightly reduce opportunities for plagiarism (though perhaps increasing opportunities for unfairness), she will use two species. She will assign species, either Drosophila melanogaster or Nanoarchaeum equitans, selected with equal probability for each student. A few days in advance, the instructor emails the plan to the class. Receiving no complaints at this stage, she then randomly assigns species to students. During the class, each student seeks a homologue of the Mus musculus protein in his assigned species.
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If a student at Obama University was assigned D. melanogaster, assuming no mistakes are made, he will obtain exactly the same BLAST results a student at Cameron University. Are the inferences the two students may make from these results the same?
The obvious answer is, 'of course'. This would be accepted by all three branches of statistics. For
Bayesian and likelihood inference, this is axiomatically so. Likelihood ratios (and their log 2 form, referred to by BLAST as bit scores) are invariant whether one considers the broader composite experiment at Obama University or the smaller component experiment the student actually performed there. For classical statistics, the convention is to make the inference 'as conditional as possible' on the experiment actually performed, rather than a broader but intuitively irrelevant composite experiment. In this case, the area under the null distribution, for each alignment with D.
melanogaster, should be 1.
If, instead, one decided that the Cameron University student should take the broader composite experiment as the scope of the study, from a classical statistical point of view she would have to multiply each of her p-values by the probability of being assigned D. melanogaster, which is 1/2.
Suddenly, all the alignments found by BLAST are more statistically significant. This approach would seem odd, and indeed is. It violates the principle of conditionality, informally expressed as 'the irrelevance of (component) experiments not actually performed' (Birnbaum 1962) .
Thinking further about conditionality: anyone rejecting the principle of conditionality lives in a very strange world. It becomes impossible to know where the boundaries of any experiment should lie.
Perhaps the professor at Obama University had been influenced by having to mark 250 answers to the same exam question at short notice, due to the death of a colleague. She found this tedious and p. 13
stressful. This memory 'tipped the balance', causing her to run a more interesting, composite experiment with two species instead of one. Should the p-values also be multiplied by the probability of the instructor having had to mark 250 answers to the same question at short notice?
Should they be further combined with the presumably probabilistic mental processes, which in these circumstances lead to the decision to perform a composite experiment? The p-values get lower every time, and any result will become enormously significant. Pushed far enough, this just reflects what is obvious: any path of events, through time, is improbable.
Rejecting conditionality, then, one would get bogged down in a sort of 'causal nexus', where every experiment is arbitrarily complex. In classical statistics, depending on areas under a null distribution, inference would depend less on the simple experiment actually performed and more on how much extraneous detail is bundled along with it. In Bayesian or likelihood approaches, there is no problem analysing the composite experiment but it makes no difference to inference. Analysing Kahnemann suggests 'farmer' is the right answer, because farmers outnumber librarians in the USA by a factor of more than 20:1. No matter that Steve has the Gestalt of a librarian, actual librarians are so rare that Steve is probably just a farmer who seems like a librarian, not a librarian who seems like a librarian (Table 1) .
Applying Bayes' theorem (Equation 2), the posterior probability of Steve being a librarian is proportional to a high value, multiplied by x; the posterior probability of Steve being a farmer is proportional to a low value, multiplied by a value exceeding 20x. Is Kahneman's answer the correct one? There is no real doubt that the posterior probability of 'farmer' is higher.
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However, likelihood inference addresses a different question. Presented only with the evidence at hand -Steve's librarian-like personality -which hypothesis is the best fit to the observations about Steve, in the sense that it would most frequently lead to these observations? The answer is, clearly, 'librarian'. Among librarians, those characteristics typical of librarians would frequently occur.
Among farmers, those characteristics typical of librarians would less frequently occur. Likelihood inference cares only about the explanatory value of hypotheses, not about their probability.
Neither answer is wrong, but the questions differ. For inference, we typically have no sensible view on prior probabilities of hypotheses, and likelihood avoids having to make them up. In likelihood, because the probability of hypotheses is not considered, it is up to the user to ensure absurd hypotheses of enormous explanatory power are omitted from the study, for example the 'gremlins in the attic' hypothesis analysed by Sober (2008, 10) . This is unsatisfactory, but arguably a fair delimitation of the realm of statistics from other, extra-mathematical concerns.
For prediction, we have typically learnt plenty about the probability of hypotheses. Including this prior information is entirely sensible. Hence, the 'incorrectness' of our instinctive answer about Steve depends on whether the answer concerns likelihoods (as might be appropriate for inference) or concerns probabilities (as are appropriate for prediction).
Our innate grasp of statistics, though clearly still flawed as many of Kahneman's (2012) examples illustrate, is is not so bad from the point of view of likelihood inference. Perhaps our rapid, intuitive decisions are more based on likelihood than probability. If this were the case, it would not be surprising. A likelihood inference requires keeping in mind the signs typical of the various hypotheses (e.g. the personality traits of librarian and farmer) and calculating their relative explanatory power for the data at hand. A Bayesian answer additionally requires that we keep in p. 16 mind the prior probabilities of these hypotheses; and that we modulate the prior by the likelihood. This is one more set of memories to recall, and one more calculation to perform. It is intriguing that, in the absence of any other information, people tend to use the prior alone (Tvesky and Kahneman 1974). Perhaps our mental aversion is to the full Bayesian analysis, rather than to the prior as such.
I have ignored classical statistics in this case-study, because such approaches do not fit the question naturally. We cannot sensibly choose either 'farmer' or 'librarian' as a null hypothesis. Neither is a good 'default position' comparable to the lady being unable to distinguish whether milk or tea went in the cup first (Fisher 1935a, 13-20) . This also raises some warning bells about the value of classical statistics. A separate difficulty with classical statistics appears with large data, for which the implausibility of the detail of null hypotheses can lead to high significance combined with low biological relevance (Kumar et al. 2012 ; O'Meara 2012, 277-278).
Case study: priors in Bayesian inference on network structure
Consider a problem in network inference. There are three nodes, A, B, and C. Nodes are connected by edges, and edges have no direction (e.g. A connected to B is the same as B connected to A). We will rule out redundant edges and self-connections. For these three nodes, the full set of possible networks is shown in Figure 1 .
A priori, we have no idea which is the correct network. We might choose to reflect this in a prior distribution on network topologies where the probability of each network is equal:
p. 17 On first sight this is reasonable. For example, if the data at hand provide no information at all, then the likelihood function will contribute nothing, and our posterior distribution is the same as our prior -we still have no idea which is the correct network.
However, this sensible-seeming prior on networks implies a very different prior on the number of edges per node in the network, as follows: Now, if our data contribute nothing to our views, after the analysis we are left believing that a network with 2/3 of an edge per node is three times more probable than a network with 1 edge per node.
To fix this, we might instead set the prior not on network topology, but on edges per node in the network. We could set this prior as follows: We may choose to place the uniform prior on the aspect of the network that most interests us.
However, this is certainly influencing other aspects of the result, which may be of interest to other researchers; and may cause unease even within our own study.
The general impossibility of priors representing a total state of ignorance 'across the board' is a fundamental aspect of Bayesian statistics, appearing even in single-parameter problems when we consider transformations (Fisher 1956, 16-17; Edwards 1992, 58-60; Gelman et al. 1995, 56) . For example, perhaps we wish to make inferences about the area of squares. We will measure edge length and from this calculate area, and will use a uniform prior. However, a uniform prior on edge length implies a quadratic prior on area; a uniform prior on area leaves us with a square-root prior on edge length. One solution is to abandon the prior entirely, and base all inference on the likelihood function. This is equivalent to the smallest conceivable prior on all aspects of the solution simultaneously, and in fact is the likelihood approach.
Priors in phylogeny reconstruction
Typically, Bayesian phylogeny reconstruction software uses a uniform prior on tree topology (Holder and Lewis 2003) . At first glance, this is a sensible representation of our total ignorance, prior to performing the phylogeny reconstruction, as to which possible topology is correct.
However, it is clade existence which we are usually interested in, as reflected in the typical use of posterior probabilities for clades in reported results (not probabilities for entire tree topologies). As is now well documented, a uniform prior on topology implies a non-uniform prior on clade size, with large and small clades more probable than clades of intermediate size (Pickett and Randall 2005; Randle and Pickett 2010) . For example, for five species there are fifteen unrooted bifurcating p. 20 tree topologies. In Figure 2 , for convenience, these are shown rooted with the same species as outgroup. A uniform prior across these topologies -i.e. a prior probability of 1/15 for each topology -implies a non-uniform prior on clade sizes (Table 2) . Bayesian phylogeny reconstruction for five species is then predisposed to find clades of size two more than clades of size four, and clades of size three least of all.
Different priors on topology may be used, with the aim of greater biological realism. However, since the actual processes underlying the tree are not known -we do not have a situation along the lines of a 'well shuffled pack of cards', and never will -the prior will necessarily remain controversial. Indeed, attempts to define a plausible prior (e.g. Velasco 2008) may simply shift the problem, from a direct prior on topology to priors on the parameters of the model generating the prior on topology (Autzen 2011 ). An analogy may be drawn to Fisher's long-term but ultimately unsuccessful quest for a general method to make uncontroversial, direct probability statements about a parameter, known as fiducial inference (Fisher 1935b; Fraser 1968; Zabell 1992) . Fiducial inference was cast in non-Bayesian terms but may be regarded as an attempt to find entirely uncontroversial, 'uninformative' priors (Seidenfeld 1992) . Either this is impossible, or we do not yet have the intellectual means to achieve it.
Topology is only one aspect of a phylogeny reconstruction. Priors are also required on branch lengths and all other parameters of the model of evolution, for example substitution rates and residue frequencies if they are allowed to vary. For example, an exponential prior for branch lengths may be reasonable when substitutions are modelled as a continuous-time Markov process (but cf.
Ekman and Blaalid 2011). Even if this is accepted, what should the mean of that prior distribution
be? For Bayesian phylogeny reconstruction, a mean is required and it does matter (Yang and Rannala 2005; Yang 2006, 180; Ekman and Blaalid 2011). p. 21
Although the Bayesian approach provides a useful mechanism to incorporate prior knowledge (Huelsenbeck et al. 2002) , in practice we do not have prior knowledge of a sufficiently detailed kind. Our prior knowledge tends to be straightforward and categorical, for example that the ingroup is monophyletic (e.g. Buschbom and Barker 2006) . Such knowledge can be incorporated into any method of phylogeny reconstruction as a simple constraint on the tree topology. There is no theoretical reason to introduce the additional baggage of having to propose a distribution on all aspects of the phylogeny reconstruction problem, predisposing our inference towards certain results in a way that is not obvious. However, for complex models a likelihood approach may be impossible. Where the area of research seems to demand such models, this is a strong incentive to use a Bayesian rather than a likelihood approach (e.g. Thorne et al. 1998; Drummond et al. 2006; Huelsenbeck et al. 2006; Rannala and Yang 2007) .
Model selection for maximum likelihood phylogeny reconstruction
The likelihood principle applies to a model whose mathematical structure is fixed. How do we select this model structure in the first place? For phylogeny reconstruction by a conventional maximum likelihood or Bayesian approach, a model of DNA or protein substitution is required. We could specify a single model based on non-statistical criteria, or alternatively select one among a range of models on statistical grounds. For selecting a substitution model, the topology of an initial phylogenetic tree is obtained by some rapid means; a range of models is fitted to this topology by maximum likelihood; one model among them is chosen, according to a criterion based on its likelihood and number of free parameters (e.g. Keane et al. 2006; Posada 2008 ).
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Likelihood alone cannot be used for model selection, except for a restricted set of models that have the same number of free parameters. This is because adding a parameter to a model can only increase the model's explanatory power, hence increase its likelihood. For a range of hierarchical models, the most complicated model would always be selected. Yet the most complicated model may suffer from 'overfitting' -that is, paying too much attention to details that prove irrelevant.
To avoid overfitting, then, for likelihood-based model selection we require some concept of 'penalty' for extra parameters. Various penalties, or 'rates of exchange' between number of parameters and improvement in likelihood, have been proposed. Edwards (1992, 199-202) representing an alternative hypothesis, and obtain a p-value from the likelihoods using a likelihood ratio test (Wilks 1938) .
As well as violating the likelihood principle, a likelihood ratio test seems unsuited to selecting a model of substitution. Here, a substitution model is required, but there is no strong basis for defining any one model as a null hypothesis. For selecting among a range of models without resorting to a significance test, AIC and BIC both have justifications, but may conflict. Prior to statistical model selection, we could reduce the size of the problem by using biological criteria to the extent possible. For phylogeny reconstruction, for DNA sequences, does it make sense to accept a model in which the A-to-G rate of evolution differs from the T-to-C rate? Such models are p. 23 frequently used (e.g. the general time-reversible model). However, by the base-pairing rules within the DNA double helix, we know that an A-to-G substitution on one strand implies a T-to-C substitution on the other (and so on, for all possible substitutions). Such arguments do not point us to a single model. For example, the model of Zagordi and Lobry (2005) where results could be evaluated according to known data (Barker et al. 2007 ).
Overall, the problem of model selection is not solved. Model selection occupies the interface between extra-mathematical concerns (which models are we even willing to consider?) and mathematical concerns (which model has best statistical fit to the data?), and is expected to remain controversial. The matter is further discussed by Posada and Buckley (2004) .
Case study: dating nodes on a phylogeny
In the previous section, I was optimistic about use of biological criteria to constrain models.
However, biological criteria may also lead us to models of such complexity that they are intractable in the likelihood framework. Dating nodes on a phylogeny provides an example. Early stages of an attack on the dating question are possible with a likelihood approach but, as yet, it appears the later stages are not. The central problem is the confounding of time and of evolutionary rate. Where two sequences have diverged greatly, we might infer either a long time since the divergence event, or a short time but a high rate of substitution.
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Within the likelihood framework, it is straightforward to estimate branch lengths on the assumption of a molecular clock acting across the phylogeny, and to test the extent of evidence for violation of this assumption (Felsenstein 1981; Yang 2006, 226-228) . If the assumption is sound, we might regard branch length from the clock-assuming model as proportional to time. Further, where dates of some nodes on the phylogeny are known, time and rate may be separated, providing estimates of divergence times even where there are several molecular clocks operating within different parts of the phylogeny (Yoder and Yang 2000; Yang and Yoder 2003) . Assignment of branches to rate categories must be known or assumed, or else may be performed by a heuristic approach dependent on autocorrelation among nearby branches (Sanderson 1997) . These likelihood and heuristic methods do not incorporate uncertainty in the 'known' dates of nodes, though this uncertainty is biologically relevant (Graur and Martin 2004; Shields 2004; Rannala and Yang 2007) . Bayesian approaches, in contrast, can incorporate uncertainties in dates (Yang and Rannala 2006) and varying rates across the tree without user assignment of branches to categories (Drummond et al. 2006; Yang 2006, 245-257; Rannala and Yang 2007) . On one level, this provides exactly what we would hope for: a realistic model incorporating uncertainty. However, this comes at a price. For example, Yang and Rannala (2006, 214-215) 'describe a method that enables the researcher to incorporate any statistical distribution to describe uncertainties in the age of a calibration node and leave it to the individual to choose an appropriate prior for the problem at hand'. The Bayesian approaches to dating remove obvious problems such as point-estimates of node dates, which are unrealistic, but introduce the new problem of which priors to use. In practice, the prior can have a strong influence on results (Dos Reiss et al. 2014 ).
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Time travel / waiting for the aliens
Two final thought experiments are these. Firstly, going forward another 130 years, how will our methods and analyses look? Secondly, if aliens landed and turned out to have higher intelligencesay, as different from ours as ours as ours is from apes' -how laughable would our attempts at statistical inference seem?
Research should be open and not fraudulent. Within these constraints, I suggest that an overemphasis on drawing strictly correct conclusions will doom us to humiliation. Even now, before the future or the aliens have arrived, we know that most published papers are wrong (Ioannidis 2005) .
With an emphasis on the less definable concept of intellectual progress, however, there is hope. For example, Lamarck (1809) proposed a detailed mechanism of evolutionary change which was wrong in every important respect. On the other hand, Lamarck recognised the earth as old and evolution as real. His attempt to bring biology within the realm of universal laws (along the lines of physics;
Pichot 1994) launched an ambitious research programme which is still incomplete.
I suggest that, of the three statistical approaches it is likelihood -'clean' on extra-mathematical and axiomatic grounds though not always practical -that will stand out most positively to the aliens and the people of the future. This should be recognised as partly an aesthetic decision, with which some will disagree.
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Conclusion: what should we do?
For a problem of inference such a phylogeny reconstruction, where there is no very obvious way to construct an empirical prior, on theoretical grounds Bayesian inference seems the wrong approach.
Mathematically, Bayesian inference is fine and works. It also has the immense attraction of giving a posterior probability distribution for hypotheses -giving us a mathematically sound view of the certainty of our inference. However, a subjective prior is usually required, and this may not be defensible in all respects (e.g. Felsenstein 2004, 288-305) . My suggestion is, where technically feasible, to abandon the prior entirely -which is to say, use a likelihood approach. Since this is based on extra-mathematical arguments, others will disagree and it is perhaps safer to 'leave [these problems] as an exercise for the reader' (Huelsenbeck and Bollback 2007, 484) . Certainly, I do not expect to uncontroversially and unambiguously solve a major problem in statistics in this, or any other article.
Within a likelihood framework, the best-supported tree is the maximum likelihood tree. This can be estimated for a wide range of models using existing software (e.g. Guindon et al. 2010; Stamatakis 2014 ). For the model at hand, the maximum likelihood tree is the combination of topology and set of branch lengths which would lead to our observed multiple alignment more frequently than any other. It is worth noting that non-Bayesian, global criteria of tree construction are often maximum likelihood approaches, in the sense of seeking a maximum likelihood tree under some set of assumptions (e.g. Tuffley and Steel 1997) . The assumptions implied by the criteria vary enormously and not all are sensible, but this is a separate issue.
For phylogenetic investigations where a likelihood approach cannot be used, one may present results limited to the early stages of the investigation which are amenable to likelihood; present p. 27 results that go somewhat further, but are based on heuristic models; or present results that appear to answer all questions we have in mind, but depend on priors in ways that are not obvious. For dating nodes on a phylogeny, these correspond to a likelihood approach to test for departure from clocklike evolution; a heuristic rate-smoothing approach departing from the likelihood framework; and a fully Bayesian approach. How far are we willing to move from theoretical preferences, to achieve detail in the answer to the biological question at hand? The answer depends on the perceived importance of getting some kind of answer to our question and the perceived importance of the departure from theoretical preferences. My suggestion is for analyses not to move extremely far along this route, perhaps stopping at the likelihood or heuristic stage. But these are subjective matters, beyond the realm of statistical inference.
When reporting Bayesian analyses, including details of priors does not solve the problems associated with priors, but at least highlights the conditional nature of the results. Discussing the early papers that brought a Bayesian approach to phylogeny reconstruction, Felsenstein (2004, 296) finds 'the lack of a clear explanation of what prior was used is an agonizing omission'. Looking at recent systematics literature, things have improved. In the latest issue of Systematic Biology (Volume 63, Issue 4), at least some priors are noted by every paper using a Bayesian phylogenetic approach. However, in some cases there are gaps in reporting: either failure to report part of the prior, or reference to default settings for software. In the short term, the full set of priors may be possible to derive from current software defaults, but in the long term this information will become lost or unclear. There is also a danger that 'the default priors' attain an unwarranted respectability not accorded to other priors, through repeated use alone.
It is a property of likelihood that likelihoods are not comparable across different studies. For simple statistical analyses, this is not a problem, because full likelihood functions are comparable, and are p. 28 equal if proportional. However, for phylogeny reconstruction there is no sensible way to obtain likelihood intervals for clade existence. In practice this means, for a cross-study 'currency'
expressing support for clades in maximum likelihood phylogeny reconstruction, we have to work harder or accept an approach that is less than ideal. One might for example use the bootstrap (Felsenstein 1985) , which has a classical statistical justification (involving experiments that were not performed and sets of data which were not observed); or perhaps construct a likelihood ratio, comparing the hypotheses that a branch has length zero with a hypothesis that it has its length in the maximum likelihood tree (Anismova and Gascuel 2006) .
Although classical statistics is axiomatically flawed, it is widely used and regarded as not terrible in practice, though it is hard to quantify the effect of violating an axiom. Discussing Birnbaum's (1962) paper on the likelihood principle, Kempthorne (1962; citing Fisher 1956, 66) wrote, 'I am reminded of Fisher's statement (which I do not really understand) that the use of a tail probability ...
is "not very defensible save as an approximation."' Turning this on its head, 'the use of a tail probability is defensible as an approximation'. For example, though we cannot calculate likelihood intervals for clade support due to insurmountable practical constraints, we might use bootstrap support values as an approximate indicator. Bootstrap clade support suffers from some of the same problems as clade posterior probabilities (Pickett and Randle 2005; Yang 2006, 176-177) , though unlike posterior probabilties is based only on model at hand and (though indirectly) the observed data. But we should have more faith in a clade with 99% support than for a clade with 2% support, and in this way bootstrap values are helpful in an informal way. It is also notable that Birnbaum, who developed the likelihood principle and provided two proofs of it, for practical purposes in his genetics research came to prefer the classical statistical approach of confidence intervals (Birnbaum 1972 ).
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As a biologist, for many years I assumed statistics was essentially 'over' as an area of research -the bioinformatics of its time, having peaked around the 1930s and lingering on mainly in applied contexts. More recently, through actually looking at the literature of statistics, it is clear that it is not true and my assumption was based only on ignorance. The field of statistics is as messy as any other area of research, with contradictory points of view in abundance. The purpose of this article is partly to guide readers towards considering a likelihood approach where possible and perhaps a classical statistical approach where not, though this latter with reservations and the hope that the suggestion will become obsolete in the next 130 years. More importantly, though, I would like to guide systematists towards a more complete understanding of the basis of the analyses they perform, whatever statistical approach is involved.
